The sharpening tensions in Georgia, sparked by last Saturday’s contested parliamentary election, are reminiscent of many previous mass protests in Eastern Europe. Unfortunately, the case of Georgia shows yet again that the EU’s tools and political will to promote democracy and counter malign foreign influence in its neighbourhood are limited.
Ever since the Orange Revolution of 2004 in Ukraine, Russia has been stepping up its interference in “post-Soviet states” in order to keep them under its grip, block their European orientation, and suppress democracy.
The pattern looks eerily familiar, indeed. In November 2004, hundreds of thousands of protesters came out to the streets of Kyiv, triggered by the presidential election where Viktor Yanukovych, then-candidate promoted by Russia, was declared a winner amidst reports of widespread irregularities. Leonid Kuchma, president at that time, revealed years later that Russian President Vladimir Putin had urged him to disperse the protests by force, which he refused to do. Instead, a repeat election was organised, and won by the pro-western contender Viktor Yushchenko.
Putin interpreted these events as an anti-Russian western plot and drew his lessons. Since then, Russia has been developing means of election interference abroad (partly, by re-introducing old Soviet methods), which are instrumental to its increasingly aggressive efforts to restore control over the post-Soviet space.
In November 2013, when Ukrainians took to the streets again to rally against the country’s turn towards Russia, then-President Yanukovych did follow the Russian playbook and tried to silence the dissatisfied citizens with violence. Ukrainians did not budge and continued to fight Russia’s ever-more brutal attempts to destroy the country’s independence.
A contrary tale has unfolded in Belarus, where the pro-Russian dictator Aliaksandr Lukashenka, with Russia’s support, violently cracked down on pro-democratic protests after the rigged presidential elections held in August 2020. The country has lost much of its sovereignty and Lukashenka has had no choice but to back Russia’s war against Ukraine.
The Beacon of Hope
The EU has not been a major actor in any of these events, although an elusive “European perspective” has been an important motivator for the protesters aspiring to a better life. Brussels has declared support to democracy and human rights, as well as assisted reforms in its eastern neighbourhood, but struggled to respond to Russia’s hardening geopolitical approach. However, it is noteworthy that Europe has remained attractive to a large part of the citizenry in the eastern neighbourhood, while none of the countries located between the EU and Russia has voluntarily chosen to subsume under Russian control (not even Belarus; just look at Lukashenka’s attempts to maintain at least some degree of independence and resist being pulled to Russia’s war).
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has prompted the EU to take new steps towards becoming a geopolitical actor. To begin with, the EU acknowledged that there was a geopolitical fight going on that it had to enter, albeit against its will. It chose the side of Ukraine and offered unprecedented support, including military aid. The EU gave candidate country status to Ukraine, Moldova, and (conditionally) Georgia, thus committing itself to a vision of integrating countries that Russia was violently trying to keep under its grip.
Yet, the limits of the new “geopolitical EU” have been evident in all three new candidate countries. The EU and its member states still lack sufficient hard power tools to push back the Russian aggression in Ukraine (or defend themselves if need be), while the US has the tools but has been short on the will to act decisively. Due to the west’s failure to provide sufficient support to Ukraine, Putin continues to believe he can eventually win in Ukraine and beyond.
A Disunited Response
The EU’s lack of unity is another evident weak spot. On election day in Georgia, Hungary, which currently holds the rotating presidency of the Council of the EU, rushed to congratulate the incumbent pro-Russian Georgian Dream party on victory, even before the official results had been announced. Two days later, Viktor Orbán personally conveyed the same message by visiting Tbilisi. Hence, it is clear that there will be no consensus among member states regarding the response to the events in Georgia, which may take a violent turn.
The OSCE election observers reported “an uneven playing field, pressure and tension,” but the EU’s initial response merely called on the Georgian authorities to “transparently and independently investigate and adjudicate electoral irregularities.” Statements aside, hardly anyone expects the relevant Georgian authorities at this point to perform as impartial guardians of free and fair elections. Several European politicians have called on the EU not to recognise the election result.
The battle is profoundly asymmetric. The EU offers its model of democracy and welfare, as well as a strictly conditional membership prospect and conditional aid. Russia relies on a mix of brutal violence, intimidation, and limited, but skilfully selected, economic benefits that enable it to buy some local support (as we have witnessed in both Moldova and Georgia). Stoking fear that a European orientation leads to war has been an important element in the Russian narratives being spread in Georgia and Moldova in recent years.
A long fight ahead
In the short term, the least the EU can do for Georgia is not to legitimise the election, punish the authorities responsible for repressions, and reinforce support to civil society. A replay of the Ukrainian events of 2004, with repeat elections and a democratic change of power, is highly unlikely. A more likely scenario is one similar to Belarus 2020, with hardened repression and the majority of the democratic opposition and civil society fleeing the country.
In Georgia, the limits of the EU’s geopolitical power are being exposed yet again, which will encourage the Kremlin to stick to its goal of restoring the lost empire and eventually change the security order in Europe. The involvement of the US remains crucial but increasingly uncertain. Europe has a long way to go to become a geopolitical actor capable of defending itself and securing democracy against the long-term threat of authoritarian Russia.
Yet, we must not forget that Russia’s ability to rebuild its empire with violence and fear also has its limits. The Soviet Union was not expected to collapse … until it did, thanks to a mix of internal decay and external pressure. Georgia is one of the hotspots in the geopolitical struggle between Europe and Russia, and between democracy and autocracy. It is a long fight, the outcome of which is not predetermined. Ukrainians, Georgians, and other nations in Eastern Europe have agency in this fight, although Russia tries hard to deny it. The EU must remember that it, too, has agency and co-responsibility for the fate of its neighbours.