Memo to the US: Focus on NATO’s Eastern Members

The transatlantic alliance between the United States of America and Europe is built upon certain foundational facts. France is America’s oldest ally; Germany is the continent’s largest economy; and since the end of the Second World War, every successive government in both the United States and the United Kingdom has emphasized the importance of the Special Relationship. This has shaped US policy towards Europe for decades. 

Since the fall of the Iron Curtain, the European community has grown substantially, though. Washington’s approach to the continent has not kept pace with the eastward expansion of both the European Union (EU) and NATO, now doubled from 16 members to 32. While Western Europe remains politically, diplomatically, and economically dominant, Central and Eastern Europe are rising. On average, these economies are growing faster, and in the military domain, they have proven to be NATO’s most committed members. 

There is a clear correlation between proximity to Russia and higher defense spending, with Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Finland among the highest and Spain, Luxembourg, Belgium, Italy, and Portugal among the lowest. 

Getting each member of the alliance to spend more on defense has been a bipartisan priority for years. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has finally forced the majority of the alliance to meet (or at least target) the 2% of GDP minimum standard, but there remains a clear divide on the question of how to approach the Russian threat to Europe. 

For President Biden and Chancellor Scholz of Germany, the importance of NATO’s “unity” is a constant theme. In practice, though, this has often meant prioritizing Western European economic interests — German interests in particular — over the alliance’s security concerns, usually voiced by NATO’s eastern front members. 

Very early in the President’s term, he waived sanctions on the Nord Stream 2 pipeline despite bipartisan opposition from Congress. The State Department justified the decision by claiming that the sanctions would “negatively impact US relations with Germany, the EU, and other European allies and partners.” 

When the priority is “unity,” the actions taken by the alliance will inevitably be reduced to the lowest common denominator. This allowed Germany to prevent allies from donating Leopard tanks to Ukraine for nearly a year. Chancellor Scholz only relented when President Biden also pledged to provide tanks to Kyiv. Following that decision, the President continued to fight against allowing F-16s to be provided before finally relenting. 

In both cases, Central and East European countries, along with the Nordic states, have been at the forefront of the fight to deliver more decisive support to Ukraine and have put their money where their mouth is — nine of the top 10 contributors to Ukraine’s war by GDP are from this group. The admission of Finland and Sweden into NATO has further shifted the center of gravity in the alliance from the North Sea to the Baltic Sea. 

While President Biden’s administration is not recognizing this new reality, the United States will soon have a new President.

Regardless of whether former President Trump or Vice President Harris is sworn in next year, the United States needs a new Europe policy. After both parties have expended so much effort in trying to increase NATO’s collective defense budget, it should not be controversial to give due recognition and attention to the members who have risen to the challenge and beyond. 

This should be priority number one: the concerns and opinions of the Nordics, the Baltics, Poland, Romania, and the Czech Republic need to be elevated. Given President Trump’s strong relationship with President Duda of Poland, this should be a comfortable policy for the Trump Administration. 

And for Vice President Harris, she has leaned strongly into her commitment to continue supporting Ukraine on the campaign trail, and even made a direct pitch to Polish Americans and other Central and Eastern European Americans for their votes on that basis. While she has been a consistent defender of the administration’s policies, she is also expected to largely replace its current roster of senior foreign and security affairs personnel. 

Who she chooses to replace them will be instructive as to how her policies will differ. Phil Gordon, her National Security Advisor, has deep ties to Western Europe and may be an impediment to an eastward pivot. 

Regardless, the ultimate test for the next administration’s Europe policy remains Ukraine. Continuing aid to Ukraine is essential for both its survival and NATO’s security. The success of NATO rests on American leadership, not dishonest appeals for “unity.” 

For the alliance to remain strong and enduring for another 75 years, there needs to be a commitment from both sides of the Atlantic that the United States will continue to lead so long as the rest of the alliance pulls its weight. 

The eastern members are already doing that and more. The path forward for Washington is to align with them to forge a new consensus and invite the rest of the team to sign onto the program. With a strong, reinvigorated NATO, the United States will be finally positioned to execute its long-desired pivot to Asia. 

Colby Badhwar is a security columnist for The Insider, a Russia-focused, independent media outlet. He writes on global security issues, with an emphasis on armaments and the arms trade. He is a founding member of Tochnyi, a collaborative project covering the War in Ukraine with a weekly podcast, where his research and analysis can be heard. He resides in Toronto, Canada.

Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.