In the big picture of global security, a single factory making gun barrels for tanks, due to open in 2027, doesn’t change the balance of power. But when the factory is owned by the German arms manufacturer Rheinmetall and the planned location is in the UK, it says something significant about alliances in a volatile world. Rheinmetall’s investment was confirmed last week as part of a new defence pact between Berlin and London. This Trinity House agreement between Europe’s two biggest defence spenders is modelled on the 14-year-old Lancaster House treaties between the UK and France.
The timing, within four months of Labour’s election victory, reflects Sir Keir Starmer’s ambition to make defence and security cooperation the central plank of a broader reconciliation with European allies post-Brexit. Although the Trinity House accord is a bilateral pact with Germany, the prime minister wants reintegration on this level to build trust on the road to a more systemic EU-wide agreement, covering not only military matters but energy security and cooperation to combat the climate crisis.
The EU has welcomed that overture. There is growing recognition in the bloc that Britain cannot be treated as just another “third country” where defence and security capabilities are concerned. Continental minds have been focused on this conundrum by the possibility of Donald Trump winning next month’s US presidential election. Mr Trump proved himself an unreliable partner to Nato in his first term. A second one might see him withdrawing American support for Ukraine and generally abetting Russian interests in Europe.
Even if Mr Trump loses, the threat has been sufficient to accelerate European pursuit of “strategic autonomy” – recognition that the continent cannot rely on US security guarantees. That imperative overrides resentments from the Brexit process that might obstruct cross-Channel negotiations.
Or at least it should do. There is recognition in European capitals (including London, now that the Conservatives are out of power) that closer integration serves a mutual economic and strategic interest. But turning that into practical agreements is not straightforward. One reason Sir Keir has focused on security is that deals in this area can be struck without renegotiating the trade and cooperation agreement (TCA) that stipulates terms for the post-Brexit relationship in most areas. There is no appetite for unpicking the TCA in Brussels.
However, Labour should not read too much into the distinctions between trade and defence when it comes to EU treaties. A volatile global security climate stirs protectionist impulses everywhere. The continental conversation about strategic autonomy runs parallel to the evolution of an industrial strategy for consolidating and renewing the single market. Integration across that line is still taboo for Sir Keir.
That will throw up obstacles if a Labour government wants to be more involved in the various EU security initiatives – a common defence fund and a collective reinforcement act – that aim to coordinate arms development and procurement across the union. Outside the single market, Britain will find it hard to define a role for itself in those arrangements. That doesn’t spoil Sir Keir’s plan, but it requires a clearer articulation of the UK’s post-Brexit European future. The Trinity House agreement is an important step, but towards what destination? The prime minister should have a more coherent answer to that question.