During the breakup of Serbia and Montenegro, the contentious matter of Kosovo’s future remained at the forefront of Serbian politics. Talks begun in 2005 resulted in a plan—proposed by the UN envoy Martti Ahtisaari in 2007 and supported by the United States and most members of the EU—that called for independence for Kosovo, albeit under international supervision. Serbia rejected the plan, however, and months of further talks between Serbian and Kosovar leaders were inconclusive. With the support of the EU and the United States, Kosovo declared independence in February 2008. Serbia, backed by Russia, China, and several members of the EU, refused to recognize Kosovo as a sovereign country.
In the wake of Kosovo’s secession, Serbia’s governing coalition—composed of the pro-European Democratic Party (Demokratska Stranka; DS) and its offshoot, the centre-right Democratic Party of Serbia (Demokratska Stranka Srbije; DSS)—collapsed. For a European Serbia, a pro-EU bloc led by Serbian president and DS leader Boris Tadić, won nearly 40 percent of the vote in the May 2008 parliamentary elections. The nationalist Serbian Radical Party, however, captured nearly 30 percent, making the formation of a pro-EU governing coalition less certain. Nevertheless, in July the pro-EU alliance joined with a Socialist-led bloc of parties to form a new government whose stated goal was to obtain EU candidacy for Serbia. Accordingly, in December 2009 the Serbian government officially applied for EU membership.
The newly formed Serbian Progressive Party (Srpska Napredna Stranka; SNS), which had split off from the Radicals in 2008, had by 2010 joined the DS in supporting Serbia’s accession to the EU. In March 2010 the Serbian parliament voted to condemn the 1995 Srebrenica massacre of Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims). It stopped short of calling the killings an act of genocide, but the vote helped to advance Serbia’s EU candidacy. Domestic support for EU accession rose following the lifting of the Schengen visa restrictions on travel to EU member countries in December 2009. This rise in support coincided with the beginning of the ratification process of a Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the EU and Serbia.
In July 2010 a ruling from the International Court of Justice found that Kosovo’s declaration of independence did not violate international law. The nonbinding decision did not settle the question of borders or other matters that remained to be resolved with Kosovo, however.
In May 2011 Gen. Ratko Mladić—who had commanded the Bosnian Serb army during the Bosnian conflict and who was a fugitive from charges of genocide and crimes against humanity—was captured in Serbia. In announcing Mladić’s capture and the preparation for his extradition to The Hague, Tadić said, “Today, we close one chapter of our recent history that will bring us one step closer to full reconciliation in the region.” In July the arrest and extradition of Goran Hadžić, the other major Serb war crimes suspect at large, allowed Serbia to take another step toward eventual membership in the EU. The troublesome question of recognizing Kosovo’s independence remained.
The Serbian economy showed signs of modest growth in 2010, buoyed by a new IMF loan and some currency depreciation after a 3 percent decline in 2009. Nevertheless, unemployment topped 20 percent, and the austerity-related freezes in public salaries threatened political consequences for the DS. The growth of exports and the revival of foreign direct investment appeared to be dependent on a general European recovery.
In October 2011 the European Commission recommended Serbia for elevation to EU candidate status, but EU member states decided to postpone that action until Serbia could demonstrate that it had taken steps to normalize relations with Kosovo. Clashes between Serbs, Kosovar Albanians, and NATO peacekeepers in Serb-dominated northern Kosovo injured dozens, and violence threatened to spiral out of control as Serbs in Kosovo rejected Pristina’s attempts to impose customs controls at the border. After EU-mediated talks in December 2011, Serbia and Kosovo agreed to jointly manage the border crossings. Citing this as proof of Serbia’s commitment to regional stability, the European Council granted Serbia status as a candidate country on March 1, 2012.
Continued high unemployment, accusations of corruption, and a sluggish economy sparked a wave of general dissatisfaction with the DS government, as the euro-zone debt crisis hampered the return of foreign investment. In legislative elections held in May 2012, the populist SNS won the largest share of votes, but a DS-led coalition finished close behind, leaving the third-place SPS in the role of kingmaker. Two weeks later, SNS leader Tomislav Nikolić defeated two-term incumbent Tadić in the second round of presidential balloting. Observers initially worried that Nikolić, who had previously advocated an anti-Western form of Serb nationalism, would divert Serbia from its pro-EU course. Nikolić was quick to clarify that he believed that closer integration with Europe was the key to Serbia’s future. Nikolić was inaugurated in late May 2012, but negotiations on the formation of a new government stretched into July. Ultimately, the SNS entered into a coalition with the SPS and the United Regions of Serbia party to form a government, with SPS leader Ivica Dačić at its head. In April 2013 Serbia and Kosovo agreed to normalize relations, although Serbia stopped short of recognizing Kosovo’s independence. The Kosovar government vowed to grant limited autonomy to ethnic Serbs in northern Kosovo, and both countries stated that they would not work to hinder the other’s progress toward accession to the EU. The European Commission responded to the development by recommending that the EU begin membership talks with Serbia, and accession negotiations formally opened in January 2014.
Wishing to capitalize on the popular support for this milestone, the SNS called for a snap election in the hopes of solidifying its mandate. The move was successful, and in March 2014 the SNS captured a clear parliamentary majority, winning more than 150 of the legislature’s 250 seats. The leader of the SNS, Aleksandar Vučić, was a one-time ally of Slobodan Milošević, but his campaign focused on economic reform and anticorruption measures rather than nationalism. He promised to continue to follow a pro-European path by privatizing inefficient state businesses and liberalizing the economy, a goal made all the more challenging by an unemployment rate that continued to hover around 20 percent.