Democratic Belarus in the EU: here to stay

Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya speaking at the New Belarus Conference in Vilnius in August 2024. Photo: The Office of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya / flickr.com

2020 and the Belarusian diaspora

The year 2020 saw the largest mobilization of people in Belarusian history. Hundreds of thousands of Belarusians went to protests across the country to demonstrate against another falsified election and in support of democratic change in the country. These protests were met with harsh repressions from the security forces. Despite recent releases of political prisoners, repressions and human rights violations continue. People are prosecuted, fired and detained for likes and comments on social media, or are sentenced in absentia in show trials which appear to be bringing back the times of the Soviet Union.

This extremely repressive environment forced many Belarusians into exile. Along with other waves of emigration, and with at least 200,000 people moving away since 2020, the Belarusian diaspora is now at about 1.5 million people. Significant centres can be found in Georgia, Russia and the EU. And while the legal situation for Belarusians in the EU is difficult, and the situation of democracy in Belarus is dire, a democratic Belarus and democratic Belarusians are here to stay in the EU.

The Belarusian democratic forces since 2020

With the protests crushed, people in prison and repressions increasing in severity, the democratic forces faced a choice: be jailed or go into exile. Over the course of winter and spring from 2020 to 2021, many chose exile. With this move, the democratic forces established three structures: the Office of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, functioning as a “Presidential office” – as she has won, in all likelihood, the elections; the United Transitional Cabinet, which can be seen as a government in exile, with representatives addressing issues from the economy and foreign affairs to education and social policy; and lastly the Coordination Council, which was originally established to handle a peaceful transition of power but is going through a process of democratization in exile. Following online elections in May 2024, it functions as a “proto-parliament”, where Belarusian (civil) society is represented.

These elections provided an alternative to the Belarusian House of Representatives, which is part of the regime in Belarus. In total, voted, about 0.01 per cent of potential Belarusian voters. While this is a small number of votes, the fact remains that despite cross-border repressions and a delayed campaign, these elections were free and the outcome is undisputed, unlike elections inside Belarus. Furthermore, the Belarusian regime seemed nervous about them, as it opened . Most of all, it is an example of the ongoing democratization of the democratic forces.

Meanwhile, the Office of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya has settled in Vilnius and works to keep Belarus on the agenda with political leaders in Europe and beyond. The Cabinet is present in Warsaw, and diplomatic missions of the democratic forces have sprung up in Estonia, Czechia and Belgium. This ongoing and deepening process of institutionalization, bringing together different voices and political streams within the diaspora, means that the Belarusian democratic forces are amongst the best organized diasporas. The three structures provide an alternative Belarus to Lukashenka’s regime and their visibility is significant. As such, they also serve as an example for other diasporas facing repressions, such as the Russian opposition in exile. But it is not only the political process that continues in exile. NGOs and previously politically active people keep making their mark, both within Belarus and in exile.

The Belarusian NGO sector has also been in flux after 2020. Where before 2020 there was a relatively “open” environment for Belarusian NGOs in the country, this civil space has been almost completely closed. This means that there are three types of NGOs now active around Belarus: organizations that remain in the country, which undertake small activities if they are still legally registered, or engage in small-scale, underground activities; NGOs that operate fully from exile; and those which operate in a mixed format with activists inside and outside Belarus. These NGOs are complemented by an organized Belarusian diaspora, which set up infrastructure in Central Europe, such as in Poland or Lithuania, but also in Germany and the Netherlands. It is these NGOs and diaspora organizations which also function as one of the bridges between those in the EU and those in Belarus.

Furthermore, there is cross-fertilization between NGOs and the political structures as people who leave the political structures of the democratic forces continue their efforts in specific fields. Two recent examples come to mind here. First, this can be seen with regards to Olga Gorbunova, the former representative for social policy. She left the United Transitional Cabinet but continues to work to bring attention to the issue of political prisoners in Belarus, of which at least 1300 still remain behind bars according to the Belarusian human rights organization Viasna. Similarly, Valery Kavaleuski the former representative for foreign affairs founded the Euro-Atlantic Affairs Agency to focus on Belarus’s transatlantic future. In sum, this means that Belarusian democratic political life is continuing, developing and branching out, reaching out to new partners and into new initiatives.

A European alternative for Belarus?

Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia, the Belarusian democratic forces have sided strongly with Ukraine. This is present not only in political statements but also in actions of solidarity with Ukraine. There are also Belarusian volunteers fighting on Ukraine’s side. At the same time, the democratic forces have opted, alongside this strong support for Ukraine, for a European path for Belarus, advocating for the future membership of Belarus in the EU. Rather than remaining neutral between Europe and Russia, the EU is seen as a safe space where Belarusian society can prosper, as evidenced by Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the de facto occupation of Belarus by Russia.

This engagement with the EU is not a one-way street. Although the EU is not in a position to fully embrace Belarus as a future member, it does engage with the Belarusian society and does embrace it as a European people. It has redirected funds previously available to Belarusian local and regional government to urgent needs and medium-term support of citizens, civil society and the democratic forces. Due to this, it fosters links with the Belarusian “alternative”. The launch of a Consultative Group, which functions as a high-level platform for exchanges between EU representatives and Belarusian democratic forces and civil society, is a case in point here. Furthermore, there is EU4Belarus, which is specifically aimed at Belarusian students and academics to study and do research in the EU.

The European Parliament has been an active forum as well, with numerous resolutions, speeches by MEPs and MEPs “adopting” political prisoners under the slogan WeStandBYyou, which was launched by the German NGO Libereco. Finally, the last Council Conclusions on Belarus strongly emphasize Belarusians’ struggle to live in a democratic country that is part of a peaceful Europe. With these statements, support programmes and concrete actions, the EU and its member states are engaged in keeping the democratic movement alive, as well as providing the framework for it to develop in a democratic way within the EU. The elections further the internal institutionalization of the democratic forces and increased ties with EU institutions offer an example of that process.

Furthermore, the EU and Belarusians in the EU together engage in addressing some of the most pressing issues for Belarusians, such as the mobility of people to the bloc, the situation of political prisoners – such as support for people who were released but are at risk of re-imprisonment – and the legalization of Belarusians’ residency in the EU. The EU and Belarusians share a goal in Ukraine as well. The Belarusian regime is complicit in Russia’s invasion, with Belarus being used by the Russian army as a field hospital and workshop. Lukashenka’s fate, many believe, is thus tied to the outcome of the war, as he cannot hold on to power without financial and military backing from Russia. This has aligned the goals of the EU and the Belarusian democratic forces: a victory for Ukraine, which in the ideal scenario would create momentum for democratic change in Belarus.

Belarus and Belarusians in the EU: here to stay

Despite the hardships faced by Belarusians to obtain visas to the EU, which is clearly laid out in a recent article on this platform, the fact remains that hundreds of thousands of Belarusians now reside inside the EU, alongside the Belarusian democratic forces which continue to be active and develop their structures. And they are here to stay.

Looking at the continued EU support for Belarusian NGOs and human right defenders, plus the redirected funds from the Belarusian authorities to the civil society sector, funding remains in place. While the full-scale invasion of Ukraine took the spotlight away, programmes of support continue. Considering that the goals of the democratic forces and the EU – at least in a declarative sense – are similar, such as a democratic Belarus free from Russian influence and a Ukrainian victory, creates an additional reason for continued support and the creation of a safe harbour for Belarusians in the EU. And while the democratic forces go further by preparing the stage for a future Belarusian accession to the EU, Belarus and its people cannot be overlooked and excluded from a possible future in which they are part of the EU, just as we can see Ukraine being part of the EU.

The very presence and activities of the Belarusian diaspora, supported by the EU, mean that the democratic forces and democratically-minded Belarusians are here to stay – first in their fight against dictatorship in Belarus, and perhaps in the future as EU citizens. It is up to the EU, its member states and its people to provide support and open their arms to a people and a country which started to open itself to them since 2020.

Wicke van den Broek is a PhD candidate at Maastricht University, researching EU democracy promotion in Belarus within the framework of Horizon 2020 project ‘EMBRACE’. For more information on the research project, see https://embrace-democracy.eu/. Previously, Wicke studied at the College of Europe in Natolin, and worked as a trainee at the European Border and Coast Guard in Warsaw.

“We suport the Belarusian Awakening’24” is a project co-financed by Solidarity Fund PL within the framework of Polish development cooperation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland in the amount of PLN 230,000.

This publication expresses the views of the author only and cannot be identified with the official position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland.

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belarus, Belarusian emigration, Belarusian opposition, Belarusian protests 2020, EU-Belarus