[SS fom the essay by Erik Lin-Greenberg. He is the Leo Marx Career Development Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.]
Israel’s assassination of a top Hamas leader in Tehran in July, Ukraine’s incursion over the summer into Russia, and a recent series of increasingly assertive Chinese air and maritime interceptions in the South China Sea have fanned fears that long-simmering conflicts could escalate into broader wars. In the wake of these provocations, analysts fret about the heightened risk of military accidents and strategic misperceptions. They worry that incidents of this sort could ratchet up tensions until policymakers lose control and stumble into wars they do not intend to fight. As U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said in August, attacks in the Middle East “raise the risk of dangerous outcomes that no one can predict and no one can fully control.”
Although provocative incidents can push crises up the escalation ladder, truly inadvertent wars are rare. History provides few examples of conflicts that have erupted without policymakers’ authorization, and leaders frequently exercise restraint to avoid combat, especially in high-stakes situations. During the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, for example, U.S. policymakers held off on retaliating after Soviet troops shot down an American spy plane, stepping back from the brink of war. When faced with the risk of a spiraling conflict, rivals often find off-ramps to de-escalate crises. This brinkmanship requires careful choreography: states must learn how to pressure their adversaries just enough to shape their behavior without crossing thresholds that could trigger a significant response.
Even then, crossing redlines does not make conflict inevitable. The death of three U.S. soldiers in an Iranian-backed drone strike in January did not start a war between Washington and Tehran. In April, the massive drone and missile attack that Iran launched against Israel did not ignite a full-scale conflict between those two states. But to avoid war, leaders on both sides must restrain themselves at moments of crisis without losing face or showing weakness. To do so, they must carefully consider their actions—how, when, and where to pressure rivals in ways that avoid triggering escalatory retaliation. They must also establish direct or indirect communication with adversaries, facilitating arrangements that permit both sides to claim success in their coercive actions while reducing the potential for misinterpretation. Understanding how to navigate the interplay of pressure and restraint empowers leaders to step back from the edge of war.
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[SS fom the essay by Erik Lin-Greenberg. He is the Leo Marx Career Development Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.]
Israel’s assassination of a top Hamas leader in Tehran in July, Ukraine’s incursion over the summer into Russia, and a recent series of increasingly assertive Chinese air and maritime interceptions in the South China Sea have fanned fears that long-simmering conflicts could escalate into broader wars. In the wake of these provocations, analysts fret about the heightened risk of military accidents and strategic misperceptions. They worry that incidents of this sort could ratchet up tensions until policymakers lose control and stumble into wars they do not intend to fight. As U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said in August, attacks in the Middle East “raise the risk of dangerous outcomes that no one can predict and no one can fully control.”
Although provocative incidents can push crises up the escalation ladder, truly inadvertent wars are rare. History provides few examples of conflicts that have erupted without policymakers’ authorization, and leaders frequently exercise restraint to avoid combat, especially in high-stakes situations. During the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, for example, U.S. policymakers held off on retaliating after Soviet troops shot down an American spy plane, stepping back from the brink of war. When faced with the risk of a spiraling conflict, rivals often find off-ramps to de-escalate crises. This brinkmanship requires careful choreography: states must learn how to pressure their adversaries just enough to shape their behavior without crossing thresholds that could trigger a significant response.
Even then, crossing redlines does not make conflict inevitable. The death of three U.S. soldiers in an Iranian-backed drone strike in January did not start a war between Washington and Tehran. In April, the massive drone and missile attack that Iran launched against Israel did not ignite a full-scale conflict between those two states. But to avoid war, leaders on both sides must restrain themselves at moments of crisis without losing face or showing weakness. To do so, they must carefully consider their actions—how, when, and where to pressure rivals in ways that avoid triggering escalatory retaliation. They must also establish direct or indirect communication with adversaries, facilitating arrangements that permit both sides to claim success in their coercive actions while reducing the potential for misinterpretation. Understanding how to navigate the interplay of pressure and restraint empowers leaders to step back from the edge of war.