At the *Financial Times*, [Rose Gottemoeller ](https://www.hoover.org/profiles/rose-gottemoeller)considers the future of international nuclear arms control through milestone years 2026, 2035 and beyond. As Russia currently refuses to allow inspections of its nuclear arsenal, and the People’s Republic of China engages in a massive build-out of its own nuclear stockpiles, the world appears to be headed toward greater nuclear proliferation and instability. But Gottemoeller, applying more game theoretic analysis, shows how a western buildup in response to Russian and Chinese disregard of arms control talks could ultimately lead to a more stable equilibrium among major nuclear powers. Writing specifically of Putin in Russia, Gottemoeller suggests, “Perhaps the strengthening of the US nuclear industrial complex can be brought to his attention in a way that makes Russia’s interest in implementing the treaty abundantly clear.”
“As for the Chinese, if they reach 1,500 warheads by 2035 and continually refuse to talk then the US and its allies must consider a build-up.” Gottemoeller’s piece underscores the fact that strategic nuclear decisions do not take place in a vacuum; rather, actions by one state can and will shift the thought and action of other international actors.
While “the worst-case scenario is that Russia and China are hell-bent on increasing their nuclear holdings at the cost of global stability,” Gottemoeller also argues that the United States and its allies maintain the full capability to respond appropriately.
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At the *Financial Times*, [Rose Gottemoeller ](https://www.hoover.org/profiles/rose-gottemoeller)considers the future of international nuclear arms control through milestone years 2026, 2035 and beyond. As Russia currently refuses to allow inspections of its nuclear arsenal, and the People’s Republic of China engages in a massive build-out of its own nuclear stockpiles, the world appears to be headed toward greater nuclear proliferation and instability. But Gottemoeller, applying more game theoretic analysis, shows how a western buildup in response to Russian and Chinese disregard of arms control talks could ultimately lead to a more stable equilibrium among major nuclear powers. Writing specifically of Putin in Russia, Gottemoeller suggests, “Perhaps the strengthening of the US nuclear industrial complex can be brought to his attention in a way that makes Russia’s interest in implementing the treaty abundantly clear.”
“As for the Chinese, if they reach 1,500 warheads by 2035 and continually refuse to talk then the US and its allies must consider a build-up.” Gottemoeller’s piece underscores the fact that strategic nuclear decisions do not take place in a vacuum; rather, actions by one state can and will shift the thought and action of other international actors.
While “the worst-case scenario is that Russia and China are hell-bent on increasing their nuclear holdings at the cost of global stability,” Gottemoeller also argues that the United States and its allies maintain the full capability to respond appropriately.