[SS from essay by Hanna Notte, Director of the Eurasia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies and a Nonresident Senior Associate with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.]
Since Hamas’s October 7 attack on Israel, Russia has enjoyed watching the deteriorating situation in the Middle East preoccupy its main adversary, the United States. On April 13, however, Moscow grew concerned when, in retaliation for an attack on the Damascus consulate of Iran, its growing ally, Tehran launched more than 300 missiles and drones at Israel. Although that attack was effectively neutralized by antimissile defenses and coordinated support from the United States and Arab and Western partners, Israel responded six days later with a strike on an S-300 long-range air defense system in Isfahan, a city deep within Iran. When calibrating their actions, both Israel and Iran signaled that they were keen to avoid sliding into war. Yet by directly targeting each other on their own soil, the two longtime foes suggested that the unwritten rules of engagement between them have changed, making it harder for each to gauge the other’s actions and intentions and limit the risk of escalation. This has worried Russia, which has been walking a fine line between undermining U.S. strength in the region and not becoming overly committed and does not want to see a wider war in the Middle East.
Of course, mounting tensions between Iran and Israel could have advantages for Moscow. For one thing, further escalation in the Middle East would almost certainly divert Washington’s attention and supplies from [Ukraine](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/regions/ukraine), where Russia is currently on the offensive. This dynamic was already apparent in the immediate aftermath of October 7, when the Biden administration sent additional Patriot batteries to the Middle East, drawing from a limited stock of systems that Kyiv was desperately seeking. In April, in anticipation of Iran’s retaliatory strike against Israel, the United States moved more military assets to the region to assist Israel’s defense. Then, in June, amid growing tensions between Israel and Hezbollah, Washington dispatched ships and U.S. Marines to the region. Further escalation would demand a commitment of additional U.S. resources, which the Kremlin can only welcome. Moreover, a Middle Eastern war would likely drive up oil prices, complicating the Biden administration’s efforts to tame fuel costs for the average American consumer months before the U.S. election. Russian President Vladimir Putin would surely rub his hands at President Joe Biden’s predicament.
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[SS from essay by Hanna Notte, Director of the Eurasia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies and a Nonresident Senior Associate with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.]
Since Hamas’s October 7 attack on Israel, Russia has enjoyed watching the deteriorating situation in the Middle East preoccupy its main adversary, the United States. On April 13, however, Moscow grew concerned when, in retaliation for an attack on the Damascus consulate of Iran, its growing ally, Tehran launched more than 300 missiles and drones at Israel. Although that attack was effectively neutralized by antimissile defenses and coordinated support from the United States and Arab and Western partners, Israel responded six days later with a strike on an S-300 long-range air defense system in Isfahan, a city deep within Iran. When calibrating their actions, both Israel and Iran signaled that they were keen to avoid sliding into war. Yet by directly targeting each other on their own soil, the two longtime foes suggested that the unwritten rules of engagement between them have changed, making it harder for each to gauge the other’s actions and intentions and limit the risk of escalation. This has worried Russia, which has been walking a fine line between undermining U.S. strength in the region and not becoming overly committed and does not want to see a wider war in the Middle East.
Of course, mounting tensions between Iran and Israel could have advantages for Moscow. For one thing, further escalation in the Middle East would almost certainly divert Washington’s attention and supplies from [Ukraine](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/regions/ukraine), where Russia is currently on the offensive. This dynamic was already apparent in the immediate aftermath of October 7, when the Biden administration sent additional Patriot batteries to the Middle East, drawing from a limited stock of systems that Kyiv was desperately seeking. In April, in anticipation of Iran’s retaliatory strike against Israel, the United States moved more military assets to the region to assist Israel’s defense. Then, in June, amid growing tensions between Israel and Hezbollah, Washington dispatched ships and U.S. Marines to the region. Further escalation would demand a commitment of additional U.S. resources, which the Kremlin can only welcome. Moreover, a Middle Eastern war would likely drive up oil prices, complicating the Biden administration’s efforts to tame fuel costs for the average American consumer months before the U.S. election. Russian President Vladimir Putin would surely rub his hands at President Joe Biden’s predicament.