From Stoltenberg to Rutte: Italy’s hopes and concerns with NATO’s new leadership

The transition from Jens Stoltenberg to Mark Rutte as NATO secretary general has been met with cautious optimism in Rome. While the strategic choices made over the past decade are understandable from the broader perspective of the Atlantic Alliance, many acknowledge that some of these decisions have left Italy—the second-largest European contributor to NATO operations and Operation Inherent Resolve after the United States—with a sense of frustration.

In particular, Rome has felt the strain of NATO’s strategic reorientation toward Europe’s northeast and away from the south. This shift has resulted from the escalating threat posed by Russia against Ukraine since 2014, culminating in Moscow’s full-scale invasion in 2022. A telling example of this pivot was the recent NATO Summit in Washington, where North African and Middle Eastern partners from the Mediterranean Dialogue forum, with the exception of Israel, were notably absent. Meanwhile, other countries, such as the Indo-Pacific Four—Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea—were prominently included. Moreover, there is a sense in Rome that Southern European countries have been underrepresented in NATO’s senior leadership.

However, as highlighted in the final communiqué of the Washington summit, the Alliance took initial steps to address Rome’s dissatisfaction. The secretary general was tasked with appointing a special representative for the southern neighborhood, while the allies committed to establishing a NATO liaison office in Amman, Jordan, and expanding the NATO Mission Iraq to strengthen Iraqi security institutions. More recently, Admiral Giuseppe Cavo Dragone was appointed as chairman of NATO’s military committee, a position he will take up effective January 1, 2025.

As a new NATO secretary general takes the helm, there is a fresh opportunity for the Alliance and the Italian government to reset intra-Alliance dynamics. It’s not solely about the stronger political relationship Rutte may have with Italy’s current leadership, particularly with Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, despite some past tensions with Rome. It is also due to Rutte’s deeper appreciation for the significance of threats emerging from the wider Mediterranean region to the Euro-Atlantic security framework.

In recent years, Rutte has taken a firmer stance on illegal immigration and the criminal organizations that exploit it, even resigning as prime minister over disagreements with his coalition partners on this very issue. His involvement in “Team Europe”—a group formed alongside European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and Meloni to negotiate with Tunisian President Kaïs Saïed—was especially significant. This collaboration proved fruitful, culminating in the signing of the EU-Tunisia memorandum of understanding in July 2023.

In his inaugural press conference as secretary general, Rutte outlined three key priorities for his term: ensuring collective defense, supporting Ukraine against Russian aggression, and effectively addressing the growing global challenges to Euro-Atlantic security. The framing of these priorities has stirred both hope and concern in Rome.

Regarding collective defense, Rutte addressed the two contentious Cs (cash and capabilities) related to the burden-sharing issue, which are particularly sensitive for Italy due to their implications for cost-sharing. Italy’s national defense spending will reach 1.49 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2024, remaining below the 2 percent threshold along with seven other allies. But that nearly €31.9 billion ($34.9 billion) sum should be seen in the context of overall Italian defense capabilities. From Rome’s standpoint, it is important to highlight that the Italian armed forces are already equipped with cutting-edge military capabilities, especially in the naval and aerial domains—so it should not be judged on percentage of GDP alone.

Turning to support for Ukraine and countering the Russian threat, Rutte rightly emphasized the necessity of continued aid. This is crucial not only because NATO is politically aligned with Ukraine, a partner nation suffering brutal aggression, but also because cutting assistance now could lead to far greater costs if Russian President Vladimir Putin were to prevail. However, Rutte did not underscore how Moscow is shaping a broad strategy aimed not merely at reestablishing its sphere of influence over Kyiv, but also at revising the entire Euro-Atlantic status quo. Over the last decade, Russia has solidified itself as a Mediterranean power. After restoring the authority of the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria, Moscow secured concessions for bases in Tartus and Latakia, and now it is seeking to deepen its Mediterranean presence with two additional bases in Cyrenaica, Libya. From Rome’s perspective, effectively containing the Russian threat will thus require a truly comprehensive, 360-degree approach.

Finally, regarding the growing global challenges to Euro-Atlantic security, Rutte’s remarks on the need to increase engagement with partners in the Middle East, North Africa, and the Sahel to address these challenges were warmly received at Palazzo Chigi. As the new secretary general rightly emphasized, such engagement is crucial for restoring political stability in the southern neighborhood and countering terrorist threats. While Rome is deeply concerned with terrorism, it also strongly asserts that Russia and other rival powers are exploiting the fragility of states from the Gulf of Guinea to the Horn of Africa to undermine NATO’s security. Indeed, these actors are leveraging the profound instability in the Mediterranean region to fuel anti-Western coups, expand the operational scope of Russia’s Africa Corps (formerly the Wagner Group), and maintain constant migratory pressure on Europe’s borders.

This series of somewhat contradictory signals should prompt Italy to seek clarity from Rutte and its allies, particularly the United States. While there is a pressing need to enhance military commitments in the face of an increasingly uncertain international landscape, Italy must also define the direction of its defense policy for the medium to long term. Beyond formalities, a genuine willingness to equitably address both NATO’s eastern flank and southern neighborhood could empower Italy to contribute more effectively to the development of a European “pillar” within NATO.

In other words, Italy expects that under Rutte’s mandate, the NATO concept of a “360-degree approach” will be fully implemented. This process should begin by extending Defense and Related Security Capacity Building programs to all nations requesting assistance, aimed at enhancing partners’ defense and security capabilities. Additionally, NATO should deepen its commitment to cooperative security initiatives with the states of the wider Mediterranean by revitalizing established frameworks like the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative to ensure ongoing and open discourse in a multilateral format. Finally, NATO must strengthen its understanding of dynamics in the southern neighborhood by granting substantial authority to the special representative, expanding the activities of the Strategic Direction-South HUB in Naples, and promoting the inclusion of Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative members in annual NATO summits as integral parts of a like-minded community.

Gabriele Natalizia is a visiting fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center. He is also an associate professor of international relations at the Department of Political Science at Sapienza University of Rome and director of the Center for Geopolitical and IR Studies at Geopolitica.info.

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From Stoltenberg to Rutte: Italy’s hopes and concerns with NATO’s new leadership