Is Serbia the West’s Friend? Take a Fresh Look

Serbia and France agreed to purchase 12 new French Rafale combat aircraft worth €2.7bn ($3bn) billion on August 29 and 30, the agreement sealed during a visit to Serbia by French President Emmanuel Macron. 

The purchase represents Serbia’s first strategic military acquisition from a major Western manufacturer since the 1950s, undoing 60 years of Serbia’s reliance on military agreements with the Soviet Union and later Russia. This military reliance served as one of Moscow’s three primary levers of influence over the largest country in the Balkans. 

Just one month prior, on July 18, Serbia and the EU signed a strategic agreement on cooperation in the field of critical materials that will give European companies exclusive access to Serbia’s critical materials to power its green energy transition. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz was in Belgrade for the signing of the agreement, which will undoubtedly erode another lever of Russian influence in Serbia, specifically in the energy sector. 

At the center of the critical materials agreement is the exploitation of one of the world’s largest lithium deposits, Serbia’s large but controversial lithium mine in Jadar, which will produce the material to power about 1.1 million electric vehicles per year. This is planned to be a key contributor to European efforts to free its industries from dependence on Chinese manufacturers.

The Kremlin reacted nervously, even angrily, to these advances by Serbia and its president, Aleksandar Vučić, because they knew that they were losing two of their three main levers of influence in Serbia to the West: military procurement and, in a strategic sense, energy.

There is still a third lever of Russian influence in Serbia and the Balkans — Russia’s soft influence, the historical Panslavist narrative about the supposed brotherhood of Serbs and Russians, bonded by Orthodox Christianity, their Slavic origin, and strong cultural and historical ties.

From the Kremlin’s perspective, this has served to support its interests in the Balkans, which have always focused on two areas: energy and weapons. Without these, Russia fears the unraveling of its mystical narrative of brotherhood.

The two examples of Serbia aligning itself with Europe are just the latest in a series of strategic moves. Since December, Serbia has reduced its dependence on Russian gas imports by opening an interconnector with Bulgaria, through which it procures gas from Azerbaijan and potentially liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the US.

Even more convincing is Serbia’s support for Ukraine. The government has rejected Russian aggression and defended Ukraine’s territorial integrity in all international forums, starting with the UN, where it voted in favor of Russia ending its invasion of Ukraine and kicking Russia off the UN Human Rights Council. In the last two and a half years, it has been sending significant humanitarian aid to Kyiv, as well as much-needed weapons and ammunition. A report in the Financial Times says that Serbia has supplied Ukraine with ammunition worth at least $900m, which represents over 30% of all ammunition provided to Ukraine by European producers.

Not everyone is convinced. The Serbian government and President Vučić are subject to skepticism regarding their genuine commitment to Europe.

It is true that an anti-Western narrative persists in influential Serbian media, with surveys showing a higher Serbian preference for maintaining good relations with Russia than for EU membership. There is a Russia-friendly sentiment among average Serbs, which no Serbian government can ignore.

The return of the strongly pro-Russian politician and former intelligence chief Aleksandar Vulin to the government as deputy prime minister in charge of “cooperation with the BRICS” is just one example of this reality. Vulin is sanctioned by the US.

Giving a handful of Russia-friendly politicians like Vulin a role in the Serbian government and public visibility, together with highlighting Serbia’s non-adoption of formal sanctions against Russia, are political tactics aimed at domestic voters. They are distractions meant to emotionally satisfy these voters, thereby creating space for the government to pursue policies that are substantively aligned with the West.

Moreover, these Russia-friendly optics aim to soften difficult decisions regarding Kosovo among the Serbian public. Aware that without a permanent compromise with Kosovo, Serbia could not achieve economic and political goals related to EU integration, President Vučić initiated the historic process of normalizing relations between the two nations. Painful decisions regarding Kosovo, which the Serbian Constitution and the vast majority of Serbian voters still treat as part of Serbia, cannot be made if the government ignores this domestic political reality. 

Thus, for the time being, the anti-Western tone in some Serbian media, in politicians’ statements, and even the occasional appointment of pro-Russian actors like Vulin to government positions will continue to be part of the government’s strategy to avoid Serbia’s large-scale destabilization by Moscow and its proxies. Collectively, these tactics amount to a strategy for navigating the intricate process of normalizing Serbia’s relations with Kosovo while avoiding a Serbian public backlash that the Kremlin would harness and amplify for its own destabilizing purposes.

The price that President Vučić and the Serbian government pay for this strategy is skepticism about its pro-Western aspirations. However, the reality is that Serbia has been gradually pulling itself away from Russia. 

One cannot equate the significance of Serbia’s permanent termination of Russian military ties in compliance with the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) measures with the fact that Vulin sits in the government without a cabinet ministry, staff, or any real authority. And it is incorrect to equate Serbia’s strategic partnership with the EU over critical minerals to, for example, Belgrade refusing to impose sanctions on Russia. 

Accusing Belgrade of “balancing” or being a “Russian agent” in the Balkans is incompatible with reality because it is becoming more difficult to find any strategically important connection between the two countries. On the other hand, such ties with the EU are abundant and constantly growing. 

Dr. Orhan Dragaš is the Director of the International Security Institute in Belgrade, Serbia. He is the author of ‘The End of the Russian World: Russia, Ukraine, Balkans and Russia: From a Failed State to a Rogue State.

Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.