Georgia’s future depends on the European Union

When hawkish Western officials say that no peace deal with Vladimir Putin would be worth the paper it’s written on, they might have a point. The Kremlin’s expansionist ambitions and its hostility to the West are patent.

Putin’s obsession with strengthening his regional influence seemed to be proved in the Georgian elections over the weekend. The incumbent pro-Russia Georgian Dream party triumphed over a pro-EU coalition, after achieving 54 per cent of the popular vote. This is a blow to Georgia’s aspirations to join the European Union. But it is a stark and dangerous moment for the bloc too: encouraging ex-Soviet countries such as Georgia to join its the club is not just an act of charity; it’s critical to Western security.

The country’s president Salome Zourabichvili joined opposition leaders in refusing to accept the result, citing allegations of Russian interference. On Saturday, videos emerged of what looked like ballot-stuffing and voter intimidation across the country. “The victory was stolen from the Georgian people,” said Tinatin Bokuchava, leader of the United National Movement, the largest opposition party. The opposition coalition called the results a “constitutional coup”.

It does not take a wild leap of the imagination to wonder why Russia may have sought to influence the outcome of this election. Georgia is in the queue to join both the EU and Nato. Firming up a pro-Russian political realm will complicate that process. And Putin is hardly coy about his desire to squeeze out any Western nations from countries like Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.

[See also: Moldova’s referendum result is a disaster for the EU]

When Russia invaded Moscow-backed separatist regions of Georgia in 2008, Putin inadvertently hastened Georgia’s bid for European integration – with a bipartisan resolution committing the country to membership of both the EU and Nato in 2013. The weekend’s election will slow a process already moving at a glacial pace, to the benefit of a Russia that has deliberately antagonised the West and tried to undermine its institutions.

Given all of this – and the threat Putin poses not just to Georgia but to the Western infrastructure of organisations – why have the EU and Nato been so slow in welcoming Georgia? By moving the Nato border closer to Russia, Putin’s capacity for intimidation is hobbled and his vulnerability to triggering an Article 5 retaliation grows. Most importantly, the better connected these ex-Soviet countries are to western Europe, the less reliant they become on economic partnerships with Russia. Trade supply chains underpin European security. Take, for example, Germany’s long-term reliance on Russian gas: it built a strong economy on cheap energy and became dependent on a Russian leader who loathes them.

This kind of economic dependence turns into political paralysis. Germany and many European counterparts have repeatedly failed to take meaningful action against Russia, even as it was preparing invasions, killing dissidents and sticking its middle finger up at Western democracy. And political dependence can, over time, become sincere friendship. Many European countries have drifted towards nationalist, insular politics in recent years, with leaders and opposition figures finding an ally in Putin.

So why can’t institutions like Nato and the EU speed up the vital process of admittance? Because it is a political process reliant on member states who are anxious about upsetting a delicate balancing act with a Russia on whom they’ve become reliant. Putin is trying to fashion a Gordian knot for the blocs’ members.

Stoking disunity in the EU is in Putin’s interest: it slows down the accession process of countries he wants to influence, and serves his wider objectives in Ukraine. Whatever happened over the weekend in Georgia should not come as a surprise to Europe watchers. But it should serve as further evidence that Putin is not someone with whom the West can negotiate in good faith.

[See also: Silent voices in the once-free city of Odesa]