Rain Rockets on North Korea’s Adventure in Ukraine

It’s one thing to discover, as we have, that North Korea is deploying troops to support Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. It’s quite another to decide what to do about it.

It’s clearly a “significant escalation” of “Russia’s illegal war”, a breach of UN Security Council resolutions and a “dangerous expansion” of the fighting, as NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte said on October 28.

The British Prime Minister Keir Starmer and US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin have both said that the deployment (now said by the US to number 10,000 men) shows Russia is struggling to find military personnel.

None of which will offer much comfort to Ukrainian troops already under severe pressure from meat-grinder assaults and emplacement-evaporating glide bombs. The troops are expected to be used in Russia’s Kursk region, as much for reasons of politics as strategy.

Even if the West is once again hesitating about a response, it can still help ensure this intervention does not succeed. The key to success is the military fist, not the political language of disapproval — North Korea must be made to bleed on the battlefield.

The Korean People’s Army (KPA) must not be improved by this endeavor. An array of intelligence means should be brought to bear to ensure that Ukraine becomes a death trap for these forces. Kim Jong Un, the mercurial North Korean leader and his ally in the Kremlin, should be shown that this sort of authoritarian military axis will not succeed.

A murderous, nuclear-armed Communist regime that regularly threatens the US and its Pacific allies with atomic rhetoric and missile launches is sending as many as four brigades some 5,000 miles across Eurasia to fight against a European country. That is extremely serious.

It demands special treatment for the North Korean troops. They should become — within military reason — the primary targets for Ukraine’s Western-supplied forces. Only by ensuring their swift destruction can the message be sent that foreign adventurism carries a very severe price.

How? To begin with, the US can coordinate with South Korea. No one has better intelligence on the rogue state than Seoul and its highly experienced espionage agencies. These, after all, were among the first to offer detailed evidence of what was happening.

Kyiv would benefit from knowing whatever the South Koreans have. This might include what forces have been sent, what training they’ve undertaken in the past, how their doctrines will mesh with Russian doctrines, and the identities of North Korean field commanders.

In return, Ukrainian intelligence and strategic analysts can provide fresh insight into North Korea’s capabilities, weaknesses, and battlefield performance to their newfound allies in Seoul. With its enormous intelligence gathering and analytical abilities, the US can contribute to this while aiding the allies’ cooperation. This would not only help inflict casualties on the North Koreans but also send a signal that Europe and the Indo-Pacific are linked geopolitical interests and that the US will confront despots across both.

US-South Korean human and signals intelligence can detect what is said between Pyongyang and expedition commanders, and receive backup from US spy satellites.

This is not a new policy and should not be controversial. US and allied intelligence agencies have already assisted Ukraine in targeting Russian forces.

South Korea has another unique card to play by assisting Ukrainian efforts to psychologically target North Korean troops. South and North Korea have battled it out in the political-psychological space since the post-World War II partition, sometimes with strange and silly tactics.

Seoul could also use this opportunity to try out methods of encouraging desertion and defection, with obvious intelligence and propaganda benefits. If North Korean soldiers are shown to be poorly motivated, confused, and unwilling to die for the despotic dream, that’s all to the good.

Ideally, North Korean forces will be more susceptible to such approaches once they are pulled out of their unique isolation. This effort would require South Korean psychological warfare experts working closely with Ukraine, possibly in-country, as linguistic expertise is crucial. This entails some risk, but South Korean-Ukrainian cooperation could provide both states with a forum for exchanging experiences.

Last but not least, South Korea has a huge armaments industry that until now has been prevented from directly supplying Ukraine. Analysis from the Institute of the Study of War suggests that South Korea may shift to providing Ukraine with lethal aid as well as intelligence, either directly or indirectly. South Korea’s defense industrial base is considerable, and its overstocked reserve of 3.4 million 105 millimeter howitzer shells could offer Ukraine significant help.

A Congressional foreign policy advisor, speaking anonymously to this author, mused: “North Korea is literally sending guys to Ukraine. There will be North Korean troops attacking a country. In Europe. If the Russians win, there could be Russian and North Korean troops on four NATO borders, if [the North Koreans] decide to hang out. The way [the West] just accepts that must seem insane in Kyiv.”

Yet again, Russia has globalized this war. Having previously used Iranian and North Korean weapons or press-ganged men from Wagner-run mining colonies in Africa, Moscow is now bringing North Korean military forces into Europe.

Pyongyang is no doubt thrilled to be one of three states — and the second nuclear state — to test its military might in a conventional, industrial 21st-century war. The only proper response is to ensure a very painful lesson that leaves it feeling chastened.

This should be an educational experience; if North Korea wishes to prepare its military for a war against modern Western or South Korean equipment, it can learn first-hand about the suffering that can inflicted by an ATACMS barrage, or pinpoint-accuracy ballistic missiles.

Michael C. DiCianna is a research fellow at the Institute of World Politics’ Center for Intermarium Studies, a Visiting Fellow at the Transatlantic Dialogue Center, and a non-resident research assistant at the Yorktown Institute.

Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.