Estonia’s view on supporting Ukraine and strengthening the Baltic Sea region security
Russia’s 2022 full scale invasion of Ukraine generated shock waves across the Baltic region and poses an existential security challenge to countries like Estonia. Estonian leaders see that war as an important element of a broader Kremlin effort to revivify the Russian empire, retake control of those former Soviet Republics now integrated in western security and economic institutions and eviscerate US influence in Europe and beyond. The challenge is grave because Putin’s Russia is prone to taking great risks, and Allies cannot discount the possibility that the Kremlin might precipitously attack Estonia or another Baltic state, occupy territory and assume NATO would not respond to what would, in effect, be a fait accompli. Like its Baltic Allies, Estonia sees little alternative but to prepare its forward defences and do so in close cooperation with its NATO Allies, which must collectively double down on enhancing deterrence. The accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO and the forward deployment of Allied troops in the Baltic states and Poland have already done much to improve the situation.
This was the core message 18 parliamentarians from the NATO PA’s Economics and Security Committee’s Sub-Committee on Transition and Development (ESCTER) heard during a three-day trip to Estonia. The delegation travelled to Tallinn to learn more about Estonia’s perspective on Russia’s illegal war against Ukraine, the state of Russia’s war-time economy and defence and defence industrial developments in Estonia itself. Cristian Bordei (Romania), the Sub-Committee’s Vice-Chair, led the delegation. The NATO PA’s Economics and Security Committee will meet during the Assembly Annual Session in Montréal, Canada, in November and vote to adopt a report, The State of Russia’s Wartime Economy by Tamas Harangozo (Hungary).
The Baltic region has significantly strengthened its position with the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO, leaving Russia as the only non-NATO member in the Baltic Sea region, Kalev Stoicescu, Chairperson of the Riigikogu’s National Security Committee, told the delegation in meetings held at Estonia’s Parliament. Finland and Sweden bring not only additional territory and military forces to the Alliance but also vital logistics capabilities, including sea and air supply routes, as well as prepositioned equipment and infrastructure needed to conduct a forward defence of the country. Asserting control over the sea and airspace is crucial for NATO, and the latest round of accessions to NATO provides strategic depth to the small countries arrayed along Russia’s western border in the Baltic region.
Estonia may be a small country, but it punches above its weight in NATO and is leading by example. Indeed, national defence expenditures currently stands at 3.4% of GDP, and the government has introduced a special purpose tax to underwrite defence spending, the Head of the Estonian Delegation to the NATO PA, Raimond Kaljulaid, told the delegates. A significant portion of these funds is allocated for civilian protection and other essential non-military capabilities needed to bolster societal resilience.
Estonia has considerably enhanced its defence capabilities and offers substantial support to Ukraine, which Estonian officials believe constitutes their first line of defence. In relation to its population size, Estonia is among the most important supporters of Ukraine’s military effort. Unlike many NATO countries with older military forces, Estonia allocates 55% of its defence budget to investment. Through the Estonian Centre for Defence Investments (ECDI), the central procurement agency, these funds are disbursed not only for ammunition, armaments and vehicles acquisition, but also for modernising infrastructure and facilities.
In his remarks to the delegation, Kaimo Kuusk, the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Defence and a former Ambassador to Ukraine, urged Allies to set defence spending targets at 2.5% of GDP. This, he said, would help Allies purchase capabilities, invest for the long-term and thereby strengthen NATO’s collective defence posture at a moment characterised by mounting security threats.
Several speakers underscored that the target of Russia’s war on Ukraine extend beyond the geopolitical landscape of eastern Europe as the Kremlin seeks to destroy Europe’s current security architecture. A Ukrainian defeat would thus have far-reaching consequences, potentially undermining the established international rules-based order, Marko Mihkelson, Chairperson of the Riigikogu’s Foreign Affairs Committee warned the delegates.
Estonia’s cyber capabilities and priorities
Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has accelerated the integration of cyber warfare into conventional military operations. Cyber attacks, such as those targeting satellite systems, have become a pillar of Russian strategy. Ukraine has demonstrated remarkable resilience in the face of this aggression and is closely observing and learning from Ukraine’s experience.
Tanel Sepp, Director General of the Digital and Cyber Diplomacy Department and Estonia’s Ambassador at Large for Cyber Diplomacy, described Estonia as a cyber democracy which has been compelled to invest heavily to protect its digital ecosystem. The 2007 cyber attacks on Estonia were a turning point in this regard, and from that point, Estonia has made cyber defence a top priority. Today, Estonia faces more sophisticated cyber threats and continues to lead in cyber security innovation and digitalisation.
Throughout the discussion, experts and officials emphasised that people are the key actors in cyber defence. Colonel Andres Hairk, Commander of the Cyber Defence Unit (CDU) within the Estonian Defence League, highlighted Estonia’s unique approach. The voluntary Estonian Defence League plays a vital role in preparing citizens for national defence. Established between the First and Second World Wars, this territorial organisation is divided into defence regions, with the Cyber Defence Unit positioned at its core.
The CDU not only supports the military and Ministry of Defence in safeguarding cyber space but also provides critical assistance to civilians. Estonia’s cyber security strategy is built on four key pillars: military, economy and services, internal security as well as science and education. The CDU draws personnel from all these areas, guaranteeing a comprehensive approach to cyber defence.
On the second day of the visit, delegates visited the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE), which plays a crucial role in helping NATO fight cyber attacks and ensuring that its members receive proper cyber training. The CCDCOE also helps Allies navigate the legal complexities of cyber operations, particularly as new technologies like artificial intelligence (AI) and quantum computing emerge.
The Centre of Excellence fosters knowledge creation through several key initiatives, including the research behind the Tallinn Manual, a comprehensive guide on the legal framework for cyber warfare, and the annual International Conference on Cyber Conflict (CyCon), which brings together experts to discuss the most topical issues related to cyber defence. Additionally, the CCDCOE conducts major exercises like Locked Shields, the world’s largest cyber defence game which conducts real-time defence both of national IT systems and critical infrastructure, and Crossed Swords, which focuses on offensive cyber operations.
The state of Russia’s economy and war impact
Throughout the visit, members heard that Russia’s economy is performing beyond expectations, with many countries, including some in the west, continuing to purchase significant amounts of that country’s energy exports, often through third countries like India. Western countries have spent more on Russian exports than they have on aid to Ukraine, Marko Mihkelson told the delegation. There is thus significantly more that Allied countries could do to raise the costs on Russia of its aggression, and Estonian officials want to see these trading ties severed.
Energy and other commodity sales and high defence spending continue to fuel the Russian economy, and it has forged consequential new trade with a range of developing countries including China, North Korea, Iran and India.
Putin has sought to shield most Russians from the war’s direct effects and continues to call it a ‘special military operation’ while avoiding large-scale conscription in the country’s most important urban centres. As Raivo Vare, a noted Estonian entrepreneur underscored, in some poor regions of Russia, the war economy has brought an unprecedented degree of economic activity, and this has generated a degree of support for it in Russian society. Meanwhile, Russia’s security services, using Cold War-era tactics, remain highly effective in squelching public dissent.
But there are nonetheless compelling questions about the long-term sustainability of Russia’s war-time economy, and this is precisely why it is important to ratchet up sanctions and their enforcement. Kerli Veski, Undersecretary for Legal and Consular Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs told the delegation that Estonia supports a full trade embargo on Russia.
Sanctions have raised the costs on Russia for its illegal war, and it is undergoing rising inflation and supply bottlenecks as a result. The oil price cap Allied countries and others have imposed on Russia have undercut energy revenues and compelled Russia to rely on smuggling operations through an international shadow fleet of tankers that evade restrictions. Labour shortages related to rising conscription and mass emigration also pose mounting economic problems.
G7 nations are currently using revenues from frozen Russian assets to guarantee loans to Ukraine. Estonia plays a leading role in this effort and has transferred roughly 30 million USD in sanctioned Russian assets to underwrite Ukraine’s reconstruction, Chairperson of the Constitutional Committee, Hendrik Johannes Terras, explained to the delegation.
Estonia’s view on the Russian threat and visit to the Tapa Army Base
On the last day of the visit delegates from Allied and partner nations travelled to the Tapa Army Base for a series of briefings with senior officers from Estonia and the United Kingdom to explore the nature of the threat that Russia poses to Estonia and its Allies and how the military is planning both to deter the Russians and, if necessary, prevail over them in a war.
Estonia’s perspective on Russia is shaped by long and bitter experience of conflict and occupation, and their strategy is animated by a determination to do what it takes to defend its hard-earned independence. The Estonian people have long recognised that Russia’s imperial identity did not die with the collapse of the Soviet Union. It simply grew more embittered, revanchist, reckless and aggressive. Russia’s wars in Chechnya, Georgia, Crimea and eastern Ukraine all fit into this pattern as does its interventions in Syria, Libya and parts of Africa. Its role in the frozen conflicts in Moldovan Transnistria and Armenia-Azerbaijan as well as its policy towards Belarus are all part of the same picture.
Estonia’s military has closely studied Russian strategy and tactics and has refined its own deterrence posture premised on what is has learned. Russia’s military relies on surprise, demonstrates a high tolerance for risk, deploys massive firepower and reveals an inclination to attack critical infrastructure in the rear and immediately constructs defensive bulwarks on land it captures early in any conflict, making it very difficult for its opponents forces to recapture lost territory. This has been particularly apparent in the war of attrition it is conducting against Ukraine. For Estonia, these clear and enduring patterns makes it imperative that it prepare a powerful and intelligent forward defence, made even more necessary given Estonia’s lack of strategic depth. It must be prepared to respond immediately to a Russian incursion and take the fight to Russia.
The victims of Russian aggression have all been compelled to fight alone. Estonia’s membership in NATO and the presence of Allied troops alongside its own are critical to Estonia’s strategy, while the accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO have meant that the Baltic Sea can now be seen as a powerful source of strategic depth and not a vulnerability.
That said, Estonia and its Allies must prepare to take on an aggressor with significantly greater numbers of battle-hardened troops. Estonia’s military leaders acknowledge that Russia will have the luxury of picking and choosing where and when to fight, will take enormous risks to achieve surprise, will target critical infrastructure well beyond the front lines and will likely concentrate its forces on one Baltic country first which, were it to fall, would then gravely imperil other Baltic Allies. Russia would essentially seek to impose a fait accompli, and Estonia and its Allies, above all else, must ensure that Russia fails in this endeavour.
As a small country, Estonia attaches great importance to several fundamental principles: it must fight smart, it must mobilise the entire country to prevail in a conflict, highly trained reserves will have to move quickly to the front to hold the line, and its arsenal must include a broad spectrum of modern and lethal equipment. Moreover, it will rely on prepositioned Allied forces prepared to fight alongside its own military in an integrated and coordinated fashion. The delegation had an opportunity to meet Estonian, British and American troops prepared to do exactly that.