A Sobering Moment in the Ukraine War

As the war in Ukraine continues well into its second year, both Ukraine and Russia are grappling with the realities of prolonged, large-scale conflict. Russia’s relentless advances in several regions, particularly in Eastern Ukraine, have significantly strained Ukraine’s defenses despite the latter’s efforts to advertise and implement its “Victory Plan.” 

This plan, which hinged on securing greater military aid, loosening restrictions on Western-donated weaponry, and mounting a decisive counteroffensive, has thus far failed to achieve its primary objective of securing Western support.

Yet at the core of Ukraine’s difficulties is the ongoing manpower struggle, exacerbated by Russia’s ability to continually draw upon not only its own vast resources but also those of allies, such as (it seems) North Korean troops. Meanwhile, the West’s hesitation to provide unrestricted access to and use of the most advanced weaponry, coupled with growing donor fatigue, has left Kyiv in a precarious position.

The availability of combat personnel is key. Russia has lost enormous numbers of people — US officials say the total is around 615,000, while UK intelligence says the numbers are increasing at a rate of more than 1,000 daily. Ukraine is estimated to have lost half that number, but its population is around a quarter of Russia’s. Sometimes war boils down to simple math like this. 

The Kremlin also has far less compunction about its recruitment strategy. Young conscripts have been largely excluded from the frontline to avoid a backlash among mothers likely to rise up in protest if their children die. But it has used ruthless tactics to fill the ranks, including the deployment of mercenaries, such as those from the Wagner Group. 

Cash-rich from its sanctions-busting activities involving energy sales, it has resorted to financial incentives. The sums offered to join up are huge by local standards, reaching around $10,000 as a signup bonus and around $2,500 monthly. Other bonus payments are available, and so is compensation for the families of the dead.

Meanwhile, the government continues to incorporate irregular fighters, including Chechens, Syrian mercenaries, various people from South Asia, and others. 

Ukraine has approached the issue much more tentatively. Those aged 18-24 are exempted from service, something the government says is required because of low birth rates from 2006. It has extended conscription to men of 25-27, and many thousands more have entered the ranks as a result, but an unknown number are dodging the draft. The defense ministry said about 500,000 were eligible for military service under the expanded criteria this year.

Almost half of Ukrainian men not currently in the military said they are unwilling to fight, a survey earlier this year showed, something mirrored in Russia where hundreds of thousands have fled to avoid the call-up.

But even at the current incredibly high rate of Russian casualties in so-called “meat assaults,” it is likely that Moscow can outlast Kyiv in a purely attritional fight.

With an estimated 500,000 active-duty soldiers, Ukraine’s military is stretched thin across a wide front, from Kharkiv in the northeast to Kherson in the south. Despite several waves of mobilization, Kyiv has struggled to replace its battlefield losses, leading to concerns about troop exhaustion and morale. This is compounded by the reality that many of Ukraine’s most experienced units have been significantly degraded after months of intense fighting. 

Some analysts now believe that Kyiv’s gamble on August’s Kursk offensive, while initially wildly successful, has unwisely and further sapped the already limited manpower available to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

Ukraine’s much-publicized Victory Plan aimed to reverse the situation by securing additional Western support and launching a counteroffensive that would push Russian forces back across critical fronts. However, this plan has hit significant roadblocks. While Ukraine has received billions of dollars in military aid from Western nations, including advanced weaponry like High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) systems, Patriot missiles, modern tanks, and now F-16 fighter jets, it has encountered substantial restrictions on how these weapons can be used.

The United States and other NATO allies have imposed conditions, particularly regarding attacks on Russian soil and this has limited Ukraine’s ability to strike deep within Russia, which could otherwise disrupt supply lines, airfields, and command structures upon which recent battlefield successes have relied. 

The constraints placed on the use of Western-donated systems have led to a situation where Ukraine is often forced to operate within its own borders, even as Russia uses its own territory as a safe haven from which to operate. 

Given the current trajectory, the West and the Ukrainian government should reassess their approach to the war to reverse the current trends.

• Lower the minimum age and more aggressively pursue conscription: The Ukrainian government must further reduce the minimum age for military conscription, likely from 25 to 22 or even 21. Moreover, Ukrainian conscription enforcement services should work more closely with European immigration and law enforcement agencies to extend conscription to Ukrainian refugee populations abroad. While the current policies are intended to maintain a sustainable industrial workforce and Ukrainian population growth, the existential nature of the war and Russia’s marked advantages in terms of population requires this rethink.
• Lift restrictions on Western weaponry: One of the most immediate ways to bolster Ukraine’s capabilities is to remove the restrictions on how Western-supplied weapons can be used. Allowing Ukraine to strike critical military targets inside Russian territory would disrupt supply lines, airfields, and Russian command centers, forcing Moscow to reallocate its forces defensively and reduce airstrikes against critical Ukrainian infrastructure. Such actions could shift the battlefield dynamics in Ukraine’s favor and put additional pressure on the Kremlin.
• Increase training and force multipliers: While Western nations have already provided training to Ukrainian forces, this effort needs to be expanded. Training Ukrainian soldiers to use advanced systems more effectively, including combined arms tactics, would enhance their battlefield effectiveness. Moreover, force multipliers, such as the provision of real-time intelligence, cyber warfare capabilities, and air support systems, could give Ukraine the edge it needs to push back against Russia’s advances. Training inside the country would also offer significant help.
• Enhance sanctions enforcement and economic pressure: While the West has imposed significant sanctions on Russia, enforcement remains uneven. Countries like India and China continue to engage in significant trade with Moscow, providing the Kremlin with a critical financial lifeline. The West must work to close these loopholes through expanded secondary sanctions, applying greater diplomatic and economic pressure on Russia’s trading partners to ensure that these punitive measures have their intended effect.
• Strengthen NATO’s Eastern Flank: The alliance must continue to bolster its presence along its eastern flank to deter further Russian aggression. A robust military posture in Eastern Europe, including the deployment of additional NATO troops and equipment, such as the recent deployment of American anti-ballistic missile defenses in Poland, would signal to Moscow that any attempts to expand the war beyond Ukraine will be met with a decisive response. This show of strength would also reassure NATO’s eastern members, who remain vulnerable to Russian hybrid warfare approaches and other provocations.

The Ukraine war has entered a critical phase. The infusion of foreign troops on Russia’s behalf, coupled with Western hesitation in providing unrestricted support, has tipped the scales in Moscow’s favor. 

Without significant shifts in strategic approach, the outlook for Kyiv is increasingly grim. However, targeted adjustments can help Ukraine regain the initiative and move closer to achieving sustainable peace.

Doug Livermore is the National Vice President for the Special Operations Association of America, Senior Vice President for Solution Engineering at the CenCore Group, and the Deputy Commander for Special Operations Detachment – Joint Special Operations Command in the North Carolina Army National Guard. In addition to his role as the Director of Engagements for the Irregular Warfare Initiative, he is the National Director of External Communications for the Special Forces Association, Director of Development of the Corioli Institute, and serves on the Board of Directors and Chair of the Advocacy Committee for No One Left Behind.

Disclaimer: The views expressed are the author’s and do not represent official US Government, Department of Defense, or Department of the Army positions.

Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.