Meet the victors in Africa’s coup belt

https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2024/07/02/meet-the-victors-in-africas-coup-belt

2 Comments

  1. Chance-Geologist-833 on

    An article from the Economist talking about the several leaders in Western Africa, primarily in the ‘Sahel’, which are led by military juntas which took power in the early 2020s (aside from Senegal). Talks how these leaders brand themselves to their country and the international community, and the reasons why they are popular with their populations. Also discusses about the tensions with ECOWAS, a group of relatively democratic countries in the same region, and also their relations with Russia, China and the West.

    The west’s relations with [countries in the Sahel](https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2023/08/01/fanatics-and-putschists-are-creating-failed-states-in-west-africa) The west’s relations with [countries in the Sahel](https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2023/08/01/fanatics-and-putschists-are-creating-failed-states-in-west-africa) seemed to have hit rock bottom in May when Niger ordered America to withdraw its forces by September—having already booted out a French counter-terrorism mission—and welcomed Russian military advisers. Then even this bottom fell out. Last month Niger, which supplies about a quarter of Europe’s uranium, revoked the mining licence of France’s state-owned nuclear-fuel company. Many fear the country will now hand over the rights to one of the world’s biggest uranium mines to a state-owned Russian firm.

    [Niger’s](https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2023/09/25/why-emmanuel-macron-is-pulling-french-troops-out-of-niger) turn against the West comes amid what many in French-speaking west Africa are calling a second “independence”. It is being spurred by a new generation of nationalists who have taken power in former French colonies from [Senegal](https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2024/03/26/senegal-proves-the-doomsayers-wrong) to Chad and the three core countries of the Sahel: Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. They have done so amid strident appeals to sovereignty and autonomy, in language reminiscent of Ahmed Sekou Touré, independent Guinea’s first president, who told Charles de Gaulle in 1958: “Guinea prefers poverty in liberty to riches in slavery”. Several have strengthened ties with Russia. All want a new relationship with the West. “‘Sovereignty’ is the big word in the region these days,” says Ibrahim Yahaya of Crisis Group, a Brussels-based think-tank. “It has become almost like a religious dogma.”

    Most prominent among the new nationalists are military leaders from the Sahel trio, where Western forces had been helping the previous governments battle jihadists linked to Islamic State and al-Qaeda. The wider group includes Bassirou Diomaye Faye, Senegal’s newly elected president, and Lieutenant Colonel Mamady Doumbouya, Guinea’s leader since a coup in 2021. “The era of the old Africa is over,” Colonel Doumbouya told the un in New York last year. “This is the end of an unbalanced and unjust era where we had no say. It is time to take our proper place.”

    The new nationalists portray themselves as the modern embodiments of the anti-colonial struggle. Colonel Doumbouya has set about rehabilitating the divisive memory of Sekou Touré, for instance by renaming Conakry’s airport after him. Burkina Faso’s 36-year-old Captain Ibrahim Traoré, who grabbed the presidency in a putsch in 2022, styles himself as the reincarnation of Thomas Sankara, a socialist leader who was assassinated in 1987.

    Some scepticism is in order. Coup leaders nearly always claim to be patriots, and often turn out to be self-serving or corrupt. Abdourahmane Tchiani, the new leader of Niger, launched a putsch against a democratically elected government when he was about to be sacked as head of the presidential guard. There is no evidence that any of the new nationalists have curbed the graft they all complained about.

    Demands for greater sovereignty partly reflect security concerns. Instability continues to spread across the Sahel more than a decade after France dispatched troops to Mali to put down an Islamist insurgency. With a record 11,643 fatalities linked to jihadist violence in 2023, the Sahel is now the global centre for terrorist attacks. Beginning in Mali in 2020, and followed by Burkina Faso and Niger, the Western-trained local soldiers who have seized power have blamed French troops—who numbered more than 5,000 in the region at their peak four years ago—for failing to crush the insurgents. Aggrieved local populations appear to agree.

  2. I think it’s useful to compare the former British colonies in West Africa with the former French colonies in terms of their attitudes towards their former colonizers. When the British colonies became independent the British basically said good luck, packed their bags, and left (except for the embassies of course). Today the attitudes of governments and people in the former British colonies are not negative towards the British, and they don’t see the British as being behind every misfortune that befalls the country.

    If you look at the former French colonies, it’s the opposite. France has tried to remain actively involved, in some cases with military bases and large companies, but also they encouraged francophone African leaders (mostly dictators) to cultivate personal connections with French politicians. This is still true today in some of the countries. However the attitudes of the populations towards France is much more negative than those of their counterparts in British colonies. France is often seen as being behind many of the coups, corruption, and rebellions in those countries. (Guinea is the exception as they wanted the French to leave immediately after independence). Is this a problem France can easily solve? I don’t know but it seems that in some countries attitudes have hardened enough that a return of French military seems unlikely.

    The new President of Senegal (Diomaye Faye) is not actively anti-France like those of Mali, Niger, and BF, but he is the first president of Senegal to have no personal connection with France or the west for that matter. He has lived his entire life in Senegal and his kids were all born there. Consequently he is likely to be less sympathetic to western pressure, though he has up to this point been cautious in his statements.

    As an aside, I spent a total of 14 years in west Africa and had plenty of time to talk to people and read newspapers and listen to politicians