[SS: Argument by Stephen M. Walt, a columnist at *Foreign Policy* and the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University]
One might see this sorry episode as just a small part of a larger tragedy, but I think it raises larger questions about American ambitions and pretentions. Foreign-policy experts in the United States obsess about preserving ‘credibility,’ largely to justify spending vast resources on conflicts and commitments that are of minor strategic importance. In the 1960s and 70s, U.S. leaders understood that South Vietnam was a minor power of little intrinsic strategic value, yet they insisted that withdrawing short of victory would cast doubt on America’s staying power, undermine its credibility, and encourage allies around the world to realign toward the communist bloc. None of these gloomy forecasts came to pass, of course, but the same simplistic arguments get recycled whenever the United States finds itself in an unwinnable war for minor stakes.”
Oh hey, it’s the guy who wrote an article literally calling for the US to appease Putin.
Isn’t it *wild* that in academia, realists blame liberals for the onset of the Second World War despite the predominant strategy used to prevent war prior to its outbreak coming *straight* from the realist playbook?
I’d call realism a cult, but that would imply that it isn’t first and foremost an FSB op.
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[SS: Argument by Stephen M. Walt, a columnist at *Foreign Policy* and the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University]
“As the New York Mets compiled a record of 40 wins and 120 losses during their comically inept inaugural season, manager Casey Stengel famously [lamented](https://www.mprnews.org/story/2009/04/14/can-anyone-here-play-this-game): ‘Can’t anyone here play this game?’ I thought of Stengel’s remark when I learned that the temporary pier the United States had built to bring relief aid into Gaza had collapsed. It was an apt metaphor for the Biden administration’s handling of the whole Gaza conflict, as [critics](https://x.com/glcarlstrom/status/1795674643120152747) on [social media](https://x.com/WajahatAli/status/1795566095698718884) were quick to point out. Constructing the pier was essentially an [expensive PR stunt](https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/what-you-need-to-know-about-the-broken-u-s-built-pier-in-gaza-and-what-might-be-next) undertaken because U.S. officials were unwilling to force Israel to open the border crossings and allow sufficient relief aid for civilians facing a man-made [humanitarian catastrophe](https://www.gulftoday.ae/news/2024/05/29/un-secretary-general-says-horror-in-gaza-must-stop-immediately). This largely symbolic effort managed to deliver about 60 truckloads of aid before rough seas [damaged the structure](https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/28/us/politics/gaza-pier-damaged.html) and aid deliveries were suspended. Repairs are now underway and will reportedly take at least a week, and the cost of the whole operation is already hundreds of millions of dollars and rising.
One might see this sorry episode as just a small part of a larger tragedy, but I think it raises larger questions about American ambitions and pretentions. Foreign-policy experts in the United States obsess about preserving ‘credibility,’ largely to justify spending vast resources on conflicts and commitments that are of minor strategic importance. In the 1960s and 70s, U.S. leaders understood that South Vietnam was a minor power of little intrinsic strategic value, yet they insisted that withdrawing short of victory would cast doubt on America’s staying power, undermine its credibility, and encourage allies around the world to realign toward the communist bloc. None of these gloomy forecasts came to pass, of course, but the same simplistic arguments get recycled whenever the United States finds itself in an unwinnable war for minor stakes.”
[**Continue reading the full argument here**](https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/06/04/biden-foreign-policy-gaza-ukraine-foreign-policy-incompetence/)**.**
Oh hey, it’s the guy who wrote an article literally calling for the US to appease Putin.
Isn’t it *wild* that in academia, realists blame liberals for the onset of the Second World War despite the predominant strategy used to prevent war prior to its outbreak coming *straight* from the realist playbook?
I’d call realism a cult, but that would imply that it isn’t first and foremost an FSB op.